Colorado Domestic Violence Case Index default

  1. People v. Campbell: Section 18-6-801(3) does not provide that the absence of the required designation in the complaint divests the court of jurisdiction. Therefore, because defendant did not object to the form of the complaint, and has not shown how he is prejudiced, we conclude that the technical defect can be corrected by remanding the case to the trial court to allow the prosecution to amend the complaint to reflect that the underlying facts involved domestic violence. See People v. Metcalf, 926 P.2d 133, 139 (Colo. App. 1996) (Crim. P. 7(e) is to be construed liberally to avoid the dismissal of cases for technical irregularities in an information that can be cured through amendment).
  2. People v. Turner: The defendant's emphasis on the fact that the subpoena was generic and that the trial court ordered the Alliance to provide a sanitized list of the services rendered to the victim does not negate our conclusion. The mere disclosure that the individual received any services violates confidentiality because it implicitly reveals statements made by the victim to the victim's advocate. Disclosing the victim's identity and the nature and extent of the services compounds the error. The statute's legislative history is consistent with this understanding.
  3. People v. Torres: Here, we find the statute to be unambiguous. It states plainly that § 18-6-801(1) "shall not apply to persons sentenced to the department of corrections." It does not suggest that subsection (1) may apply to such persons under certain circumstances or at some certain time. This clear and mandatory language does not require construction and should be applied as written. Thus, where, as here, the defendant's entire sentence is to be served in the DOC, § 18-6-801(1) "shall not apply," and because it is not part of the defendant's adjudication or sentence, no such notation should be placed in the mittimus.
  4. Ward v. Tomsick: Generally, a defendant must affirmatively waive a jury trial; however, a waiver based on the failure to file a jury demand under C.M.C.R. 223 also can meet due process requirements. In Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237 (Colo. 1992), the supreme court held that so long as the defendant was duly informed, his inaction would be considered intentional conduct. "Thus, the prerequisite of a written demand is a simple device which informs the court of the defendant's actual decision to exercise his right to a jury trial, while the lack of a written demand indicates to the court that the right has been knowingly waived." Christie v. People, supra, 837 P.2d at 1244.
  5. People v. Darbe
  6. Woods v. Denver
  7. People v. Goldfuss
  8. People v. Garcia
  9. People v. Ma
  10. People v. Moore
  11. People v. Musick
  12. People v. Wallin
  13. In re Hickox
  14. State v. Reaves
  15. State v. Mascarenas
  16. State v. Dieters

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